Abstract

South Africa’s constitutional democracy is founded on the principle that political authority originates from the will of the people. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 establishes universal adult suffrage, regular elections, a multi-party system of democratic government and constitutional supremacy as foundational values of the democratic order.

Since the democratic transition in 1994, South Africa has utilised a proportional representation electoral system based predominantly on political party lists. Although this system played a significant role in ensuring inclusivity and political representation during the transition from apartheid to democracy, its continued application has generated concerns regarding democratic accountability, the relationship between voters and elected representatives, and the extent to which citizens exercise meaningful influence over the composition of government.

This article examines whether South Africa’s current electoral framework adequately reflects the constitutional principle of government by the people. It argues that while proportional representation promotes political diversity and prevents exclusion, it has also contributed to a system where representatives are primarily accountable to political parties rather than directly to the electorate.

The emergence of coalition governments following declining electoral dominance by traditional political parties has further exposed weaknesses within the existing framework, particularly where political negotiations become centred on positions of power rather than public service delivery and constitutional obligations.

The article considers recent developments in South African electoral jurisprudence, particularly the Constitutional Court’s decision in New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa, which declared the Electoral Act unconstitutional insofar as it prevented independent candidates from contesting national and provincial elections.

That constitutional ruling was subsequently given legislative effect through the Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023, which created the statutory framework for independent candidacy. Independent candidates accordingly participated in the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, marking the first practical application of this framework at these levels. The article argues that this development creates constitutional space for further reconsideration of the electoral system.

The article proposes that South Africa should explore a reformed electoral model that builds on the existing framework for independent candidacy and considers a run-off mechanism where necessary to strengthen majority legitimacy. Such reform would promote a closer relationship between citizens and representatives, enhance accountability and ensure that democratic governance remains centred on the political will of the people.

Keywords:
Constitutional democracy; electoral reform; proportional representation; independent candidates; coalition government; political accountability; democratic participation; run-off elections.

1. Introduction

South Africa is a constitutional democracy founded upon the principle that governmental authority derives from the people. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 is the supreme law of the Republic and binds all organs of state, including the executive, legislature, judiciary and all persons exercising public power.

The constitutional order established after 1994 sought not only to replace apartheid governance but also to create a democratic system founded on human dignity, equality, freedom, accountability and meaningful political participation.

Section 1 of the Constitution identifies several foundational values of the South African state, including universal adult suffrage, a national common voters’ roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government. These principles reflect the constitutional commitment that citizens must have the ability to participate in determining who governs them. Elections are therefore not merely procedural events through which political parties obtain authority; they are constitutional mechanisms through which the people exercise their sovereign democratic power.

Since the commencement of constitutional democracy, South Africa has operated under a proportional representation (PR) electoral system. Under this system, seats in the National Assembly are allocated according to the percentage of votes received by political parties. The system was adopted primarily to ensure inclusivity and prevent the exclusion of minority political interests in the aftermath of apartheid.

Given South Africa’s divided political history, proportional representation served an important purpose by ensuring that diverse political voices could participate within the democratic process.

However, after nearly three decades of democratic governance, questions have emerged regarding whether the current electoral system continues to sufficiently advance democratic accountability. Although proportional representation has successfully promoted inclusivity, it has also created a system where political parties, rather than individual voters, exercise significant influence over the selection of representatives. Members of Parliament derive their positions primarily from party lists, meaning that their continuation in office is often dependent on political party structures rather than direct approval by the electorate.

This relationship creates a potential accountability deficit. In a representative democracy, elected officials are expected to serve the interests of citizens and remain responsive to their concerns. However, under a party-list proportional representation system, representatives may perceive their primary obligation as being towards the political party that placed them in office. Consequently, citizens may experience limited ability to reward effective representatives or remove ineffective representatives through direct electoral choice.

The challenge has become increasingly visible with the decline of single-party dominance and the emergence of coalition governments. The 2021 local government elections demonstrated a significant transformation in South African politics, with no single political party obtaining a majority in several municipalities. While coalition governments can strengthen democracy by requiring cooperation and compromise between political actors, South Africa’s experience has also revealed significant challenges. Political disagreements, disputes over executive positions and shifting alliances have, in some instances, resulted in governance instability and weakened service delivery.

The difficulties experienced in municipalities such as the City of Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni demonstrate that coalition governance requires more than numerical agreements between political parties. Effective coalitions require a commitment to constitutional principles, accountability and public interest governance. Where coalitions become driven primarily by competition for political positions, the democratic purpose of representative government may be undermined.

These developments raise a fundamental constitutional question: whether South Africa’s current electoral framework sufficiently enables citizens to exercise their political will. Democracy requires more than periodic elections; it requires a meaningful relationship between citizens and those entrusted with public power. A system that limits the ability of voters to directly influence the selection and accountability of representatives may require reconsideration.

Recent constitutional developments support this argument. In New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court held that the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 was unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded independent candidates from contesting national and provincial elections. The Court recognised that political participation includes not only the freedom to associate with political parties but also the freedom not to associate.

Following this judgment, the Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023 amended the electoral framework to provide for independent candidates, who subsequently contested the 2024 National and Provincial Elections. This decision marked an important development in South African electoral law by acknowledging that democratic participation cannot be confined exclusively to political party structures.

This article argues that South Africa should consider electoral reform aimed at restoring a stronger connection between voters and elected representatives. It does not suggest that proportional representation has failed or that political parties should be removed from the democratic process. Political parties remain essential institutions within constitutional democracy. However, the article argues that the current system should evolve to incorporate mechanisms that strengthen direct accountability.

The article proposes two possible reforms. First, South Africa should consolidate and strengthen the existing framework for independent candidates in national and provincial elections, thereby allowing citizens to elect individuals based on personal credibility, competence and public trust rather than exclusively through party affiliation.

Secondly, South Africa should consider the introduction of a run-off electoral mechanism in circumstances where no candidate or political formation obtains sufficient majority support. Such a mechanism could enhance democratic legitimacy by ensuring that elected representatives enjoy broader public support.

The central argument of this article is that electoral reform should not merely focus on the distribution of political power among parties; it should prioritise the restoration of the relationship between citizens and representatives. Democracy is ultimately sustained when citizens believe that their political choices have meaningful consequences and that those entrusted with public authority remain directly accountable to them.

2. Constitutional Democracy, the Social Contract and the Proportional Representation System: Inclusivity versus Accountability

2.1 Constitutional Democracy and the Sovereignty of the People

Democracy is founded upon the principle that political authority is derived from the consent of the governed. In constitutional democracies, the legitimacy of government does not arise merely from the exercise of state power but from the continuing relationship between citizens and those entrusted with public authority.

The South African constitutional order embraces this principle by declaring that government is based on the will of the people and that citizens participate in determining the composition and direction of government through democratic processes.

The constitutional commitment to democracy extends beyond the holding of elections. Elections represent the foundation of democratic governance, but democracy requires continuous accountability, responsiveness and participation. A constitutional democracy therefore requires institutions that enable citizens to influence political outcomes and hold public representatives accountable for the exercise of power.

The South African Constitution establishes a system of representative democracy in which citizens elect representatives to exercise legislative and executive authority on their behalf. Section 42(3) of the Constitution provides that the National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure government by choosing a President, providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, passing legislation and overseeing executive action.

This constitutional mandate places representation and accountability at the centre of parliamentary democracy.

However, representation is meaningful only where a relationship exists between the electorate and those who represent them. While political parties play an important role in facilitating political participation, democratic accountability requires that elected representatives ultimately remain answerable to citizens.

The effectiveness of a democratic system must therefore be measured not only by the diversity of political representation it produces but also by the extent to which citizens can influence and evaluate those who govern in their name.

2.2 Democracy as a Social Contract

The concept of democracy is closely connected to the idea of a social contract between citizens and the state. The social contract theory, although originating from political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, reflects the principle that individuals accept certain limitations on their freedom in exchange for collective protection, stability and the advancement of the common good.

Within a constitutional democracy, citizens confer authority upon government through elections. In return, the government assumes obligations to protect constitutional rights, provide public services, maintain the rule of law and promote social welfare. The relationship is therefore not one of unconditional obedience but one of mutual responsibility. Citizens have duties, including compliance with the law and participation in democratic processes, while the government has corresponding duties to act lawfully, rationally and in the public interest.

The South African Constitution reflects this social contract by limiting governmental authority through constitutional supremacy. Public power is not exercised according to the preferences of those in government but within the boundaries established by constitutional principles. The state exists to serve the people, and political authority remains legitimate only insofar as it reflects constitutional values and the interests of society.

The electoral system forms a central component of this social contract because it determines how citizens transfer political authority to representatives.

Where the electoral system strengthens accountability, citizens are more likely to perceive government as legitimate and responsive. Conversely, where citizens’ experience limited influence over representatives, democratic legitimacy may weaken. The challenge facing South Africa is therefore not merely whether elections occur regularly or whether multiple political parties participate.

The deeper question is whether the electoral framework enables citizens to meaningfully determine who represents them and whether those representatives remain accountable throughout their period of governance.

2.3 The Role of Elections in a Constitutional Democracy

Free and fair elections are universally recognised as one of the essential features of democratic governance. Elections provide citizens with the opportunity to choose representatives, influence public policy and replace governments that fail to meet constitutional expectations. However, the quality of democracy depends not only on the existence of elections but also on the nature of the electoral system through which political choices are translated into representation.

An electoral system determines how votes are converted into political power. Different systems produce different relationships between voters, political parties and elected representatives. Some systems prioritise representation of political groups, while others prioritise direct accountability between individual representatives and geographic constituencies.

South Africa adopted proportional representation largely because it was considered the most suitable mechanism for managing the transition from apartheid to democracy. The apartheid system had excluded the majority of South Africans from political participation, and an inclusive electoral system was therefore necessary to ensure that all significant political voices could participate in the new democratic order.

The choice of proportional representation was consequently not accidental. It reflected the constitutional commitment to inclusivity, reconciliation and political pluralism. However, the continued suitability of the system must be evaluated against South Africa’s current democratic circumstances. A system designed primarily to achieve inclusion during a democratic transition may require adjustment when the central democratic challenge becomes accountability rather than inclusion.

2.4 Proportional Representation: The Promise of Inclusivity

Under South Africa’s proportional representation system, political parties receive seats in legislatures according to the proportion of votes obtained during elections. The system ensures that political parties receive representation broadly corresponding to their electoral support. A party receiving 10% of the national vote, for example, receives approximately 10% of the available seats in the National Assembly.

The greatest strength of proportional representation is that it promotes inclusivity. Unlike winner-takes-all systems, proportional representation allows smaller political parties to gain representation and prevents a situation where substantial sections of society remain excluded from legislative participation.

This feature was particularly important during South Africa’s democratic transition, where the objective was to establish a political system capable of accommodating diverse communities and political perspectives. The system also encourages political participation by ensuring that voters supporting smaller parties are not entirely excluded from political representation. In a country characterised by historical divisions, proportional representation contributed significantly to creating a democratic legislature reflective of South Africa’s diverse political landscape.

Furthermore, proportional representation supports the constitutional principle of multi-party democracy. Section 1(d) of the Constitution identifies a multi-party system of democratic government as one of the foundational values of the Republic. A system that enables multiple political parties to participate strengthens political competition and provides citizens with greater ideological choice.

Despite these advantages, however, proportional representation also creates challenges relating to accountability and the relationship between voters and representatives.

2.5 The Accountability Deficit within Party-List Proportional Representation

The primary criticism of South Africa’s proportional representation system concerns the weakened relationship between voters and individual representatives. Because representatives enter legislatures through party lists, voters generally do not directly select individual candidates. Instead, voters choose political parties, and parties determine which individuals occupy legislative positions.

This arrangement creates a situation where representatives may owe their political survival primarily to party structures rather than directly to voters. A Member of Parliament who loses the confidence of citizens within society may nevertheless retain office if they continue to enjoy the support of their political party. Conversely, a representative who enjoys significant public support may lose their position if removed from the party list.

The consequence is a potential shift in accountability. Instead of a representative asking, “How have I served the voters who elected me?”, the political incentive may become, “How have I maintained the confidence of my party leadership?” This dynamic creates tension with the constitutional expectation that elected representatives serve the people.

The issue is not that political parties should lack influence. Political parties are essential democratic institutions that organise political participation, develop policy programmes and provide ideological direction. However, when party control becomes the dominant mechanism determining political accountability, the electorate’s direct influence may be weakened.

The absence of direct accountability is particularly significant in a system where political parties possess substantial control over legislative representation. Citizens may vote against a party’s performance but have limited ability to remove specific representatives responsible for failures in governance. Similarly, citizens may support particular individuals but lack the ability to elect those individuals independently of party structures. This accountability deficit raises the question whether South Africa’s electoral system sufficiently fulfils the constitutional promise that government must be based on the will of the people.

2.6 Inclusivity and Accountability: Finding a Constitutional Balance

The debate surrounding electoral reform should not be framed as a choice between proportional representation and direct representation. Both models serve legitimate democratic objectives. Proportional representation protects inclusivity and political diversity, while direct representation strengthens accountability between citizens and elected officials.

The challenge is therefore to develop an electoral framework capable of achieving both objectives. A purely proportional system may produce broad representation but weaken individual accountability. Conversely, a purely constituency-based system may strengthen accountability but risk excluding smaller political voices.

South Africa’s constitutional democracy requires an electoral system that balances these competing values. The purpose of reform should not be to undermine political parties or reduce pluralism, but rather to ensure that citizens possess meaningful influence over who represents them.

The Constitutional Court’s decision in New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa reflects this constitutional balance. The Court did not prescribe a specific electoral system but recognised that the Constitution does not require political participation to occur exclusively through political parties. By acknowledging the constitutional right of independent candidacy, the Court laid the foundation for legislative reform, subsequently implemented before the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, and opened the door for reforms aimed at strengthening direct representation while maintaining democratic inclusivity.

The future of South African democracy therefore requires a reconsideration of how political authority is transferred from citizens to representatives. The central question is not whether proportional representation should be abandoned, but whether it should be complemented by mechanisms that restore the direct political relationship between citizens and those who exercise public power on their behalf.

3. Coalition Governance and the Crisis of Political Accountability in South Africa

3.1 The Emergence of Coalition Government as a New Democratic Reality

The development of coalition governments represents one of the most significant transformations in South Africa’s democratic landscape since 1994. For much of the post-apartheid period, South African politics was characterised by the dominance of a single political party, the African National Congress (ANC), which maintained electoral majorities at national, provincial and many local government levels. This dominance provided political stability but also generated concerns regarding accountability, institutional oversight and the effectiveness of democratic competition.

The decline in electoral support for historically dominant political parties has altered this political environment. The 2021 local government elections marked a significant turning point, as several municipalities failed to produce an outright majority, resulting in coalition arrangements between political parties. This development demonstrated that coalition governance was no longer an exceptional feature of South African politics but had become an increasingly important mechanism through which political authority could be exercised.

Coalition governments are not inherently inconsistent with constitutional democracy. In many democratic systems, coalitions are an accepted method of governance where no single political party obtains sufficient electoral support to govern independently. A coalition can promote cooperation, compromise and broader representation by requiring political parties to negotiate and develop shared programmes of government.

Within the South African constitutional framework, a coalition government may strengthen democracy by preventing excessive concentration of political power and requiring competing political interests to cooperate in pursuit of public objectives. However, the success of coalition governance depends on whether political parties approach coalition agreements as instruments of public administration or merely as opportunities for political bargaining.

The difficulty experienced in South Africa is not the existence of coalition governments itself, but the manner in which coalition arrangements have often been implemented. Where coalition politics becomes dominated by disputes over positions, influence and institutional control, the democratic purpose of coalition governance may be undermined.

3.2 Coalition Government and the Difference between Political Cooperation and Political Competition

A coalition government requires more than an agreement between political parties to share power. It requires a commitment to constitutional values, administrative stability and the advancement of the public interest. The purpose of coalition governance should be to combine political support in order to improve governance outcomes, particularly service delivery and institutional effectiveness.

A coalition agreement should therefore be understood as a democratic commitment between political parties and the electorate. Although negotiations occur between political representatives, the ultimate purpose of those negotiations must be to advance the interests of citizens who elected those representatives.

The constitutional principle of accountability requires political actors to remember that public office is not an entitlement but a responsibility. The allocation of executive positions, committee responsibilities and leadership roles should therefore be secondary considerations compared with the constitutional obligation to provide effective and accountable governance.

However, South Africa’s coalition experiences have demonstrated that political negotiations can sometimes shift away from governance priorities towards competition for institutional control. Disputes concerning positions such as mayor, speaker, municipal manager and committee chairperson have frequently dominated public discussions, while issues relating to service delivery and administrative reform receive comparatively less attention.

This creates a democratic contradiction. Citizens vote with the expectation that political representatives will improve governance, address social challenges and deliver public services. However, when coalition negotiations become centred on political positions rather than policy implementation, citizens may perceive that their electoral choices have been redirected towards political interests rather than public interests.

Coalitions should therefore not be viewed merely as arrangements for distributing political power. They should be evaluated according to whether they improve accountability, strengthen institutions and advance constitutional objectives.

3.3 The Risks of Coalition Instability and Minority Party Influence

One of the central challenges associated with coalition governance is the possibility that smaller political parties may acquire disproportionate influence when no party obtains a governing majority. In such circumstances, a political party with limited electoral support may become decisive in determining which party or coalition controls government.

This situation is not necessarily undemocratic. In parliamentary democracies, smaller parties often play important roles in ensuring that governments remain accountable and that diverse interests are represented. However, difficulties arise where political influence is exercised primarily through demands for positions or political concessions unrelated to public policy objectives.

A coalition government becomes vulnerable when political survival depends on continuous negotiations between parties rather than a shared commitment to governance. The result may be frequent leadership changes, uncertainty regarding policy direction and administrative disruption.

The danger is that political representatives may become more responsive to coalition partners than to citizens. Where parties threaten to withdraw support unless certain political demands are satisfied, government decision-making may become influenced by political survival rather than constitutional responsibility.

This challenge demonstrates the broader accountability problem within representative democracy. If elected officials are primarily concerned with maintaining political alliances, the interests and expectations of voters may become secondary. The legitimacy of coalition government therefore depends upon whether political actors remain conscious that their authority originates from citizens, not from political agreements alone.

3.4 The City of Johannesburg: Coalition Governance and Political Instability

The City of Johannesburg provides a significant example of the opportunities and difficulties associated with coalition governance in South Africa. Following the 2021 local government elections, no single political party obtained sufficient support to govern the municipality independently. As a result, coalition arrangements were required to establish political leadership and ensure municipal functionality.

The Johannesburg coalition demonstrated that coalition governance could provide an alternative to traditional single-party dominance. It represented a shift towards a more competitive political environment where parties were required to negotiate and cooperate. However, it also exposed the challenges of maintaining political stability where coalition partners possess different ideological positions and governance priorities.

Disagreements concerning leadership positions, including disputes surrounding the position of Speaker of the Council, illustrated the fragility of coalition arrangements. Political conflicts within the municipality resulted in uncertainty regarding leadership structures and raised concerns about whether political negotiations were prioritising institutional stability or party interests.

The removal of Speaker Vasco da Gama through a motion of no confidence further highlighted the challenges associated with coalition governance. Although motions of no confidence are legitimate democratic mechanisms designed to hold office bearers accountable, their effectiveness depends on whether they are used to improve governance or merely to advance political realignment.

Where leadership changes occur frequently without corresponding improvements in administration, citizens may reasonably question whether political processes are serving democratic accountability or merely facilitating competition for power.

The Johannesburg experience demonstrates that a coalition government requires strong institutional safeguards, clear coalition agreements and a shared commitment to public service delivery. Without these elements, coalition politics risks becoming a mechanism through which political instability is reproduced rather than resolved.

3.5 The City of Tshwane: Judicial Intervention and the Consequences of Political Conflict

The challenges of coalition governance were also evident in the dispute concerning the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. The political conflict surrounding the municipality resulted in litigation involving the Democratic Alliance, the Gauteng provincial government and other political actors.

The dispute arose within the context of political disagreements that affected the functioning of the municipal council. The inability of councillors to reach agreement and maintain effective council operations resulted in administrative paralysis, ultimately leading to provincial intervention.

The litigation demonstrated the constitutional tension between democratic autonomy and the need to ensure effective governance. Section 139 of the Constitution permits provincial intervention where a municipality fails to fulfil an executive obligation, but such intervention must occur within constitutional limits and exceptional circumstances.

The dispute raised important questions regarding the relationship between political conflict and constitutional governance. While political disagreement is an ordinary feature of democracy, disagreement cannot justify the failure of elected institutions to perform their constitutional responsibilities.

The consequences of political instability were ultimately experienced not by political parties but by residents. Service delivery failures, administrative uncertainty and institutional paralysis directly affected communities who depended on municipal government for essential services.

The Tshwane experience illustrates a fundamental principle: political competition is necessary in democracy, but political competition must operate within constitutional boundaries. When political actors prioritise strategic advantage over institutional functionality, democratic governance suffers.

3.6 Coalition Governance and the Future of South African Democracy

The emergence of coalition governments should be understood as both a challenge and an opportunity for South African democracy. Coalitions have the potential to strengthen democratic accountability by reducing excessive concentration of political power and encouraging cooperation between competing political actors.

However, a coalition government cannot succeed where political parties treat public institutions as instruments for political advancement. The constitutional purpose of government is not the distribution of political positions but the protection and advancement of citizens’ interests.

The difficulties experienced in coalition municipalities reveal a deeper issue within South African representative democracy: the distance between political institutions and the electorate. Whether the government is controlled by a single party or a coalition, democratic legitimacy depends on whether citizens believe that their interests remain central to political decision-making.

The emergence of coalition governance therefore strengthens the argument for electoral reform. If political authority increasingly depends upon negotiations between parties, mechanisms must exist to ensure that individual representatives remain directly accountable to voters. The participation of independent candidates, together with further measures to strengthen their effective role in the electoral system, may provide important safeguards against excessive party-centred politics. Introducing electoral mechanisms that encourage broader public legitimacy may provide an additional safeguard.

Coalitions should not replace democratic accountability; they should enhance it. The future success of coalition governance in South Africa will depend on whether political actors recognise that electoral power is temporary and conditional upon continued public trust.

4. Judicial Recognition of Electoral Reform: The Constitutional Court, Independent Candidates and the Future of Political Representation

4.1 The Role of the Judiciary in Defining the Boundaries of Electoral Democracy

In a constitutional democracy, courts play an important role in ensuring that electoral systems remain consistent with constitutional values. While the design of an electoral system is ordinarily a matter for the legislature and political institutions, such choices are not immune from constitutional scrutiny. Electoral arrangements determine how citizens participate in government and how political authority is transferred from the electorate to representatives. Consequently, any electoral system must comply with constitutional principles of political participation, accountability and representative government.

The South African Constitutional Court has repeatedly emphasised that democracy is not merely a system of periodic elections but a constitutional commitment to meaningful participation and accountability. The right to vote, contained in section 19 of the Constitution, is central to this democratic framework. However, the significance of the right extends beyond the mechanical act of casting a ballot. It includes the ability of citizens to participate effectively in political processes and to influence the composition of representative institutions.

The constitutional legitimacy of an electoral system must therefore be assessed according to whether it enables citizens to exercise genuine political choice. A system that provides voting opportunities but substantially limits the ability of citizens to determine who represents them may raise questions regarding the depth of democratic participation.

Two Constitutional Court judgments are particularly significant in understanding South Africa’s evolving electoral framework: Premier, Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others and New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others. Although these cases arose in different contexts, both illustrate the constitutional importance of accountability, democratic choice and the relationship between political institutions and citizens.

4.2 Premier, Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others: Constitutional Limits on Political Dysfunction

The dispute in Premier, Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others concerned the governance crisis within the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and raised important constitutional questions regarding the relationship between political disagreement, municipal autonomy and effective governance.

The conflict emerged following political disagreements within the municipal council, which resulted in an inability to conduct council business effectively. The Gauteng provincial government intervened in terms of section 139 of the Constitution, placing the municipality under administration. The intervention was challenged on the basis that it undermined democratic choices made by residents during the local government elections.

The matter highlighted a fundamental tension within constitutional democracy. On the one hand, elected representatives enjoy democratic legitimacy derived from the electorate. On the other hand, a constitutional government requires institutions capable of performing their responsibilities effectively. Democracy cannot be reduced to electoral legitimacy alone; elected institutions must also function in accordance with constitutional obligations.

Section 139 of the Constitution permits provincial intervention where a municipality fails to fulfil an executive obligation. However, such intervention represents an extraordinary constitutional mechanism and must be exercised within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. The purpose of intervention is not to replace political choices with administrative preferences but to restore constitutional functionality where governance has failed.

The Tshwane dispute demonstrated the consequences of political instability within coalition environments. The inability of political parties to cooperate resulted in institutional paralysis, affecting residents who relied on municipal government for essential services. Although political contestation is a legitimate feature of democracy, political conflict cannot justify the failure of government institutions to serve the public.

The significance of this case extends beyond municipal administration. It illustrates a broader challenge within representative democracy: the possibility that political actors may become focused on controlling institutions rather than fulfilling constitutional responsibilities. Where political competition results in governance failure, citizens become the unintended victims of political disputes.

The case therefore reinforces the need for democratic systems that encourage direct accountability. If elected representatives understand that their political authority depends upon continued support from citizens rather than solely from party structures, incentives for responsible governance may be strengthened.

4.3 New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa: Opening the Door to Independent Representation

The Constitutional Court’s decision in New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others represents one of the most significant developments in South African electoral jurisprudence since the adoption of the Constitution. The case directly confronted the constitutional compatibility of South Africa’s party-list proportional representation system and considered whether independent candidates could lawfully be excluded from contesting national and provincial elections.

The applicants challenged the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 on the basis that it then prevented adult citizens from standing for election to the National Assembly and provincial legislatures unless they were members of political parties. They argued that this limitation restricted political participation by denying citizens the opportunity to seek public office independently of political party structures.

The Constitutional Court agreed that the electoral system was unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded independent candidates from participating in national and provincial elections. The Court held that the Constitution does not require political participation to occur exclusively through political parties. Rather, citizens possess the constitutional freedom to participate politically through association with political parties, through independent candidacy or through choosing not to associate with political organisations. The legislative response followed through the Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023, which amended the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 to provide for the nomination and participation of independent candidates in national and provincial elections. This framework was applied in the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, in which independent candidates appeared on the ballot. Independent candidacy is therefore no longer merely a constitutional possibility; it is an established feature of South Africa’s national and provincial electoral framework.

The judgment is significant because it recognises that political freedom includes both the right to associate and the right not to associate. Political parties are valuable institutions within democracy, but membership of a political party cannot become the only pathway through which citizens may exercise political rights.

The Court’s reasoning reflects a broader understanding of democratic participation. Democracy requires that citizens have meaningful opportunities to contribute to public decision-making. If political parties become the exclusive gatekeepers of political representation, citizens who do not identify with existing parties may be effectively excluded from full participation.

The judgment therefore challenges the assumption that party-based representation alone sufficiently reflects democratic choice. While political parties remain essential actors within representative democracy, the Constitution does not elevate them above individual citizens. Political parties facilitate democracy; they do not replace the electorate as the ultimate source of political authority.

4.4 Freedom of Association and the Constitutional Right Not to Associate

A central aspect of the New Nation Movement judgment was the Court’s interpretation of freedom of association. Section 18 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to freedom of association. This right protects not only the freedom to join organisations but also the freedom to refuse association.

The Constitutional Court recognised that compelling individuals to participate in political life exclusively through political parties may interfere with personal autonomy and political conscience. Political participation is inherently connected to individual belief, identity and judgment. A democratic system must therefore respect citizens who wish to contribute to public life without becoming members of political organisations.

Justice Madlanga emphasised that choosing to associate is an exercise of freedom of association, but choosing not to associate is equally an exercise of that right. A democratic system that requires political participation only through party membership risks undermining this constitutional freedom.

This reasoning is particularly relevant in the South African context, where public confidence in political parties has experienced significant challenges. Some citizens may wish to serve in public office but may not wish to be constrained by party ideology, internal disciplinary structures or political obligations. Independent candidacy provides an alternative avenue through which such citizens may participate.

The recognition of independent candidates therefore represents more than an electoral technicality. It reflects a constitutional commitment to expanding democratic participation and ensuring that political power remains connected to citizens rather than exclusively controlled by institutional structures. The subsequent legislative amendments and participation of independent candidates in the 2024 elections demonstrate that this constitutional recognition has moved beyond principle into electoral practice.

4.5 Independent Candidates and the Restoration of Direct Accountability

The participation of independent candidates in national and provincial elections has the potential to transform the relationship between voters and elected representatives. Under a party-list proportional representation system, voters generally evaluate political parties rather than individual representatives. Independent candidates introduce a different accountability relationship because individuals must obtain and maintain public confidence directly.

Direct elections create clearer mechanisms for citizens to reward or sanction representatives. A representative who performs effectively, responds to community concerns and fulfils public expectations may receive continued support. Conversely, a representative who fails to perform may be removed through the electoral process. This creates stronger incentives for accountability. Representatives become answerable not only to political organisations but also to the citizens who directly elected them.

However, independent representation should not be viewed as a complete replacement for political parties. Political parties perform important democratic functions, including policy development, political mobilisation and representation of collective interests. The objective should therefore be to complement party-based representation with mechanisms that provide greater individual accountability.

A balanced electoral model should retain the existing opportunity for independent candidates to participate alongside political parties, while considering further improvements to enable them to contribute effectively to legislative institutions. Such an approach would preserve political diversity while strengthening the relationship between citizens and representatives.

4.6 Electoral Reform and the Future of South African Representation

The constitutional significance of the New Nation Movement extends beyond the immediate question of independent candidates. The judgment signals that South Africa’s electoral framework is not constitutionally fixed and may evolve to better reflect democratic values.

Electoral reform must therefore focus on the central purpose of democracy: ensuring that citizens retain meaningful control over those who exercise public power. The legitimacy of government depends not merely on elections occurring but on citizens believing that their choices influence governance outcomes.

The current political environment demonstrates the need for such reconsideration. Declining voter confidence, coalition instability and dissatisfaction with political party performance suggest that many citizens are seeking alternative forms of representation. The participation of independent candidates in the 2024 elections demonstrates that an alternative avenue of representation is already available. By providing citizens with an existing avenue to vote for individuals directly, South Africa can strengthen accountability and create additional pathways for political participation. However, further reform may be necessary to ensure that independent representation operates effectively within a national and provincial governance framework.

A reformed electoral system should therefore seek a balance between three constitutional objectives:

  • Inclusivity – ensuring that diverse political interests remain represented;
  • Participation – ensuring that citizens have meaningful opportunities to influence political outcomes; and
  • Accountability – ensuring that elected representatives remain directly answerable to voters.

The future of South African democracy depends upon achieving this balance.

5. The Run-Off Electoral System as an Alternative Model for Strengthening Majority Legitimacy and Democratic Accountability

5.1 Introduction: Beyond Proportional Representation towards Majority Legitimacy

The debate surrounding electoral reform in South Africa requires consideration of not only who may participate in elections but also how electoral outcomes translate into legitimate political authority. While proportional representation has historically served the important objective of ensuring inclusivity, the changing nature of South African politics requires consideration of mechanisms capable of strengthening democratic legitimacy and accountability.

The emergence of coalition governments, declining voter confidence in established political parties and increasing demands for direct representation demonstrate that South Africa’s electoral system faces new democratic challenges. The question is no longer merely how to ensure that political diversity is represented, but how to ensure that those who govern possess a sufficiently strong mandate from the electorate.

A run-off electoral system, also referred to as a two-round system or second-ballot system, provides one possible mechanism for achieving this objective. Unlike a simple plurality system, where a candidate may win despite receiving less than majority support, a run-off system requires the eventual winner to obtain broader electoral approval.

The central argument in favour of a run-off system is that political authority should ideally rest upon majority support. A government or representative who obtains the support of more than half of participating voters arguably possesses stronger democratic legitimacy than one elected through fragmented support among multiple competing candidates. However, the adoption of a run-off system must be carefully considered within South Africa’s constitutional context. Electoral reform must not undermine the constitutional values of inclusivity, political pluralism and minority representation. Instead, the objective should be to develop an electoral framework that balances representativeness with accountability.

5.2 Understanding the Run-Off Electoral System

A run-off electoral system is a voting mechanism designed to ensure that elected candidates obtain majority support. Under this system, voters participate in an initial election in which multiple candidates or political parties may compete. If no candidate achieves the required majority threshold, usually more than 50% of valid votes cast, a second round of voting takes place.

The second round generally involves the two candidates who received the highest number of votes during the first round. Voters are then required to choose between these remaining candidates, ensuring that the final winner receives support from a majority of voters who participated in the second round. Unlike a plurality system, where the candidate with the highest number of votes wins regardless of whether they have majority support, a run-off system seeks to ensure that the elected candidate has broader democratic approval.

The system is utilised in several constitutional democracies internationally, particularly in presidential elections where legitimacy of the head of state is considered essential. Examples include France, Portugal, Brazil and several African states. Although the political contexts differ, the underlying principle remains the same: major public authority should preferably be exercised by individuals who have secured majority electoral support.

In South Africa, a run-off system could potentially be considered for elections involving executive leadership positions or constituency-based representatives. Its application would require careful constitutional design to ensure compatibility with the existing multi-party democratic framework.

5.3 The Constitutional Justification for Majority-Based Electoral Outcomes

The legitimacy of democratic government is closely connected to the principle of majority rule. Democracy requires that decisions ultimately reflect the preferences of the majority while respecting the rights and interests of minorities.

The South African constitutional order reflects this balance. Parliament is elected through democratic elections, but the exercise of majority power is limited by constitutional rights, separation of powers and the rule of law. Majority rule does not permit the majority to disregard constitutional obligations.

A run-off electoral system aligns with the principle of majority legitimacy because it requires elected representatives to obtain broader electoral approval. Instead of assuming legitimacy from a fragmented vote, the system provides a mechanism through which citizens can express a final preference between leading alternatives. This may be particularly relevant in South Africa’s evolving political environment. As the number of political parties increases, electoral outcomes may increasingly result in governments formed through negotiation rather than direct majority support. Coalition agreements may be constitutionally valid, but they may also create perceptions that political authority arises from agreements between parties rather than the direct will of voters. A run-off mechanism could strengthen the connection between electoral outcomes and public preference by ensuring that the ultimate winner enjoys majority support.

5.4 Advantages of a Run-Off Electoral System

5.4.1 Strengthening Democratic Legitimacy

The primary advantage of a run-off system is that it ensures that elected representatives possess majority support. A candidate who survives two rounds of voting has demonstrated broader acceptance among the electorate. This may strengthen public confidence because citizens can reasonably perceive that the elected representative reflects the preference of most voters rather than merely benefiting from a divided electoral field.

In societies experiencing declining trust in political institutions, legitimacy is particularly important. Governments that lack broad public confidence may struggle to implement policies effectively and maintain social trust.

5.4.2 Reducing the Effects of Fragmented Voting

South Africa’s political environment has become increasingly fragmented, with multiple political parties competing for electoral support. While political diversity is a positive feature of democracy, excessive fragmentation may create difficulties where no political formation obtains sufficient support to govern effectively.

A run-off system reduces this challenge by requiring voters to make a final choice between leading candidates or parties. It allows citizens to initially support their preferred option while still ensuring that a final decision is made between the strongest alternatives. This may reduce the possibility that governments are established through narrow electoral support combined with complex political negotiations.

5.4.3 Encouraging Broader Political Appeal

A run-off system may encourage political parties and candidates to appeal beyond their traditional support bases. In a first-round election, candidates may focus primarily on mobilising their strongest supporters. However, where a second round is required, candidates must seek support from voters who initially supported other candidates. This encourages moderation, negotiation and broader policy appeal. Candidates may be required to address concerns beyond their core constituencies, thereby promoting more inclusive political strategies.

5.4.4 Minimising the “Spoiler Effect” and Strategic Voting

In electoral systems where only a plurality is required, voters may avoid supporting their preferred candidate because they fear that doing so may contribute to the victory of a less desirable alternative. This phenomenon is often described as strategic voting.

A run-off system reduces this concern because voters can initially support their preferred candidate without necessarily eliminating their ability to influence the final outcome. If their preferred candidate does not advance, they retain an opportunity to participate in the second round. This enhances voter choice by allowing citizens to express genuine preferences rather than merely selecting what they perceive as the most realistic option.

5.5 Potential Challenges and Criticisms of a Run-Off System

Although a run-off system offers potential benefits, it also presents challenges that require careful consideration.

5.5.1 Increased Electoral Costs

A second election requires additional financial resources, including costs associated with election administration, voter education, staffing and logistics. In a developing democracy such as South Africa, where public resources are already under significant pressure, this concern cannot be ignored. However, the cost of elections must be balanced against the broader cost of ineffective governance. If a run-off mechanism contributes to stronger legitimacy and improved accountability, the financial investment may be justified.

5.5.2 Voter Fatigue and Reduced Participation

A second round of voting may result in reduced voter participation if citizens become unwilling or unable to participate in repeated elections. Lower participation could undermine the legitimacy that the system seeks to achieve. This challenge could be addressed through effective voter education, efficient election administration and potentially integrating run-off mechanisms within existing electoral processes.

5.5.3 Possible Exclusion of Smaller Political Parties

One criticism of majority-based electoral systems is that they may disadvantage smaller political parties. Parties that attract significant but limited support may struggle to influence final electoral outcomes if they do not advance to the second round.

This concern is particularly important in South Africa given the constitutional commitment to multi-party democracy and political diversity. Any electoral reform must therefore preserve opportunities for smaller political voices to participate.

A possible solution would be adopting a mixed electoral system where proportional representation continues to ensure legislative diversity while run-off mechanisms are applied to specific leadership elections.

5.6 The Suitability of a Run-Off System within South Africa’s Constitutional Framework

The introduction of a run-off system would require careful constitutional consideration. The Constitution does not prescribe a single electoral model but establishes democratic principles that any electoral system must satisfy.

The Constitutional Court has recognised that electoral systems must facilitate meaningful participation, representation and accountability. Therefore, electoral reform should be evaluated according to whether it advances these constitutional objectives.

A run-off system could complement South Africa’s existing democratic framework by addressing one of the weaknesses of proportional representation: the possibility that governing authority may emerge from political negotiations rather than direct majority support.

However, a run-off system should not replace proportional representation entirely. South Africa’s historical context demonstrates the importance of inclusive representation. A purely majoritarian system could risk excluding smaller political groups and undermining the constitutional commitment to political pluralism.

A more suitable approach may therefore involve a hybrid electoral model. Such a system could combine:

  • proportional representation to preserve inclusivity;
  • constituency-based representation to strengthen local accountability; and
  • Run-off mechanisms where majority legitimacy is required.

Such reform would recognise that democracy requires both representation and accountability.

5.7 Run-Off Elections and the Restoration of the People’s Political Will

The fundamental purpose of electoral reform should be the restoration of citizens as the central actors in democratic governance. Political parties are essential vehicles of participation, but they should not become substitutes for the electorate.

A run-off system reinforces the principle that political authority ultimately belongs to citizens. It ensures that elected representatives cannot rely solely on fragmented support or political negotiations but must obtain broader approval from the people.

The system therefore complements the broader argument for independent candidates. Independent representation creates opportunities for citizens to choose individuals directly, while run-off elections ensure that those individuals possess sufficient public legitimacy. Together, these mechanisms have the potential to strengthen the relationship between citizens and representatives, ensuring that democratic government remains rooted in the will of the people.

6. Recommendations for Electoral Reform in South Africa: Towards a More Participatory and Accountable Democracy

6.1 Introduction: Reimagining Democratic Representation

The preceding analysis demonstrates that South Africa’s electoral system has achieved significant democratic objectives since 1994, particularly by promoting inclusivity, political pluralism and the participation of previously excluded communities. Proportional representation played a fundamental role in facilitating the peaceful transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy and remains an important mechanism for ensuring that diverse political interests are represented.

However, democracy is not static. Electoral systems must evolve in response to changing political realities and emerging democratic challenges. South Africa’s current political environment reveals growing concerns regarding voter dissatisfaction, declining trust in political institutions, coalition instability and the perceived distance between citizens and elected representatives.

The central challenge is therefore not whether South Africa should preserve or abandon proportional representation, but how the electoral system can be reformed to better achieve the constitutional objectives of participation, accountability and representative government.

The Constitution requires a democratic system in which citizens meaningfully participate in determining who governs them. Electoral reform should therefore focus on restoring the relationship between voters and representatives while preserving the benefits of political inclusivity.

This article proposes several reforms aimed at strengthening democratic accountability:

  • Review and refinement of the existing Electoral Act framework governing independent candidates;
  • Development of a mixed electoral system balancing representation and accountability;
  • Introduction of majority-based electoral mechanisms where appropriate;
  • Strengthening the regulation of coalition governance; and
  • Enhancing mechanisms of political accountability beyond election periods.

6.2 Strengthening the Existing Framework for Independent Candidates

The first and most immediate reform should not be the initial introduction of independent candidacy, which has already been provided for in law, but the continued review, refinement and effective implementation of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998 as amended by the Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023, which provides for the participation of independent candidates in national and provincial elections.

The Constitutional Court’s decision in New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others confirmed that the exclusion of independent candidates from national and provincial elections was inconsistent with the Constitution. Parliament subsequently gave effect to that judgment through the Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023, which established the legislative process and requirements for independent candidates to contest these elections. The 2024 National and Provincial Elections marked the first occasion on which independent candidates participated under this amended framework. The judgment recognised that democratic participation cannot be restricted exclusively to membership of political parties.

The recognition of independent candidates represents an important step towards restoring direct democratic choice. The 2024 elections demonstrated that citizens now have the option of voting for individuals based on their integrity, competence, leadership ability and commitment to public service rather than being limited to selecting candidates pre-approved by political parties.

Independent candidates may contribute to addressing one of the central weaknesses of the current party-list system: the weakened relationship between voters and representatives. Where an individual is directly elected, their political legitimacy is derived from the electorate itself. This may strengthen incentives for responsiveness and accountability.

However, the participation of independent candidates must be accompanied by a regulatory framework that ensures fairness. The existing legislative framework should be kept under review and, where necessary, refined to ensure that it continues to provide clear and fair requirements relating to:

  • nomination procedures;
  • electoral thresholds;
  • campaign financing;
  • access to public broadcasting;
  • disclosure obligations; and
  • Accountability mechanisms.

Independent candidates should not be viewed as replacing political parties but as complementing the existing party-based system and expanding democratic participation by creating additional pathways into public office.

6.3 Adoption of a Mixed Electoral System: Balancing Inclusivity and Accountability

A second reform option is the adoption of a mixed electoral system combining elements of proportional representation and constituency-based representation.

The difficulty with a purely proportional system is that it prioritises party representation but weakens direct accountability. Conversely, a purely constituency-based system may strengthen local accountability but risk excluding smaller political parties and minority interests.

A mixed system seeks to balance these competing objectives.

Under such a model, a portion of parliamentary seats could continue to be allocated through proportional representation, ensuring that political parties receive representation corresponding to their national support. The remaining seats could be allocated through constituency elections, allowing citizens to directly elect individual representatives.

This approach would create two forms of democratic accountability:

  • Party accountability, where political parties remain responsible for advancing policy programmes and representing broader ideological interests; and
  • Constituency accountability, where individual representatives remain directly answerable to voters within defined communities.

A mixed electoral system would therefore preserve the achievements of proportional representation while addressing its accountability limitations.

The South African electoral reform debate should not be framed as a conflict between party politics and individual representation. Political parties and individual representatives perform different democratic functions. A constitutional democracy requires both collective political organisation and direct citizen influence.

6.4 Introduction of Run-Off Mechanisms to Strengthen Majority Legitimacy

A third reform recommendation is the consideration of a run-off electoral mechanism in circumstances where majority legitimacy is constitutionally or politically desirable.

The current proportional representation system allows political parties to obtain legislative representation based on relatively limited portions of the national vote. While this reflects proportionality, it may also result in governments or leaders exercising authority without direct majority support from voters.

A run-off system would address this concern by requiring candidates or political formations to obtain broader electoral approval.

Such a mechanism could be considered particularly for:

  • presidential elections;
  • constituency-based elections;
  • executive leadership positions; or
  • Circumstances where fragmented electoral outcomes make governance legitimacy uncertain.

The advantage of a run-off system is that it ensures the final winner has secured support beyond their traditional electoral base. It encourages candidates to appeal to a wider range of citizens and promotes political moderation.

However, the introduction of a run-off system must be carefully designed to avoid undermining South Africa’s commitment to political pluralism. It should operate alongside mechanisms that preserve representation for smaller political parties and minority interests.

A balanced approach could involve maintaining proportional representation for legislative elections while introducing majority-based mechanisms for specific leadership positions.

6.5 Establishing a Constitutional Framework for Coalition Governance

The rise of coalition governments requires the development of clearer institutional and legal frameworks regulating coalition arrangements. Nevertheless, coalition governments are not inherently problematic. They can strengthen democracy by requiring cooperation, compromise and accountability among political actors. However, South Africa’s recent experiences demonstrate that informal political arrangements may create instability where coalition agreements lack clarity and enforcement mechanisms.

Coalition governance should therefore be guided by principles of transparency, accountability and constitutional responsibility. Possible reforms include:

6.5.1 Mandatory Public Coalition Agreements

Coalition agreements should be publicly accessible documents outlining:

  • governance priorities;
  • policy commitments;
  • allocation of responsibilities;
  • dispute resolution mechanisms; and
  • Procedures for addressing coalition breakdowns.

Citizens should not be required to rely on private political negotiations to understand how their government is structured.

6.5.2 Limiting Position-Based Political Bargaining

Political positions within coalition governments should not become the primary motivation for coalition formation. Coalitions should be evaluated according to their ability to improve governance outcomes rather than their ability to distribute political offices among parties. Mechanisms should therefore encourage parties to demonstrate policy compatibility and shared governance objectives before assuming executive responsibilities.

6.5.3 Strengthening Councillor Accountability

Coalition instability is often intensified where elected representatives act contrary to publicly stated party positions or coalition agreements. However, councillors remain representatives of citizens, not merely political parties. Reform should therefore seek a balance between party discipline and democratic independence.

Councillors should be held accountable for misconduct and corruption, but political disagreements should not automatically be treated as democratic failures. A healthy democracy requires room for genuine political judgment and debate.

6.6 Strengthening Direct Democratic Accountability beyond Elections

Electoral reform alone cannot resolve all challenges facing South African democracy. Accountability must continue throughout the period between elections.

A strengthened democratic system requires:

  • effective parliamentary oversight;
  • transparent decision-making;
  • public access to government information;
  • ethical leadership standards;
  • meaningful public participation mechanisms; and
  • Effective consequences for failures of governance.

Citizens should not exercise democratic power only once every five years. Democracy requires continuous engagement between government and society. The constitutional principle of participatory democracy requires that citizens remain active participants in governance rather than passive observers of political decisions.

6.7 Civic Education and Democratic Awareness

Electoral reform will succeed only if accompanied by meaningful civic education.

Changes to the electoral system may create confusion if citizens do not understand how their votes translate into political representation. A sophisticated electoral framework requires an informed electorate capable of evaluating candidates, parties and government performance.

Civic education should therefore focus on:

  • understanding electoral choices;
  • evaluating representatives;
  • recognising constitutional rights;
  • understanding coalition governance; and
  • Participating in democratic processes beyond elections.

An informed electorate is essential for ensuring that electoral reform achieves its intended purpose.

6.8 A Proposed Hybrid Model for South Africa

Based on the analysis above, this article proposes that South Africa consider a hybrid electoral framework consisting of three interconnected elements:

  • First, proportional representation should remain a component of the electoral system to preserve political inclusivity and ensure representation of diverse political interests.
  • Second, the existing framework permitting independent candidates to contest national and provincial elections should be strengthened and effectively implemented to enhance direct voter choice and accountability.
  • Third, majority-based mechanisms, including run-off elections, should be considered where broader democratic legitimacy is required.

Such a model would acknowledge South Africa’s historical need for inclusion while responding to contemporary demands for accountability. The objective should not be to weaken political parties but to ensure that political parties remain instruments of democracy rather than substitutes for the electorate.

6.9 Conclusion to Recommendations

South Africa’s democratic future depends upon its ability to adapt its institutions to changing political realities. The proportional representation system successfully facilitated democratic inclusion after apartheid, but the challenges of contemporary governance require renewed consideration of accountability and citizen participation.

Electoral reform should therefore seek to restore the central position of citizens within democracy. The people should not merely choose political parties; they should have meaningful influence over who represents them and how public power is exercised.

Independent candidates, a mixed electoral system, majority-based mechanisms and stronger coalition regulation provide possible pathways towards achieving this objective.

The ultimate measure of democratic success is not merely whether elections occur, but whether citizens genuinely experience themselves as the source of political authority.

7. Conclusion – Reclaiming the People’s Political Will and the Future of South African Democracy

South Africa’s constitutional democracy represents one of the most significant democratic transformations of the modern era. The transition from apartheid to constitutional government established a political order founded upon universal suffrage, equality, human dignity, constitutional supremacy and participatory democracy.

The adoption of a proportional representation electoral system played an essential role in this transformation by ensuring that previously excluded communities and diverse political interests were represented within the democratic state.

However, democracy is not a fixed achievement; it is a continuous constitutional project requiring institutions to evolve in response to changing social and political realities. Nearly three decades after the establishment of democratic government, South Africa faces new challenges that require a reconsideration of the relationship between citizens, political parties and elected representatives.

The central concern identified in this article is that the current electoral framework, while successful in promoting inclusivity, has contributed to a democratic accountability deficit. The dominance of political parties in determining representation has weakened the direct relationship between voters and representatives. In a system where citizens vote primarily for political parties rather than individual candidates, representatives may become more accountable to party structures than to the electorate.

This does not mean that political parties are incompatible with democratic accountability. Political parties remain indispensable institutions within constitutional democracy. They organise political participation, develop policy programmes and provide citizens with ideological choices. However, political parties must remain vehicles through which citizens exercise democratic power rather than institutions that replace the electorate as the ultimate source of political authority.

The emergence of coalition governments has further demonstrated the importance of reconsidering South Africa’s electoral framework. Coalition governance is not inherently problematic and may, in fact, strengthen democracy by requiring cooperation among competing political interests. Nevertheless, the experience of coalition governments in municipalities such as Johannesburg and Tshwane reveal the risks that arise when political negotiations become focused on positions of power rather than constitutional obligations and public service delivery.

The difficulties associated with coalition governance reveal a broader challenge: democracy requires not only representation but accountability. Citizens must have confidence that their votes produce meaningful consequences and those elected representatives remain answerable to them. Where citizens perceive political decisions to be determined primarily through negotiations among political elites, democratic legitimacy may weaken.

The Constitutional Court’s decision in New Nation Movement NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others represents an important constitutional development in addressing this challenge.

By recognising that citizens cannot be compelled to participate in political life exclusively through political parties, the Court affirmed that democratic participation includes the freedom to choose alternative forms of representation.

That recognition was given legislative effect through the Electoral Amendment Act 1 of 2023, and independent candidates participated in the 2024 National and Provincial Elections, demonstrating that this avenue of representation is now part of the electoral framework. The recognition of independent candidates provides an opportunity to strengthen direct accountability between citizens and representatives.

However, the availability and participation of independent candidates alone will not resolve all challenges within South Africa’s democratic system. Electoral reform must be approached holistically. The future electoral framework should seek to balance three essential constitutional objectives:

  • Inclusivity, ensuring that diverse political interests continue to participate in democratic governance;
  • Participation, ensuring that citizens have meaningful opportunities to influence political outcomes; and
  • Accountability, ensuring that elected representatives remain directly answerable to the people.

A possible solution lies in the development of a hybrid electoral model that combines the strengths of different systems. Proportional representation may continue to preserve political diversity, while constituency-based representation and the continued participation of independent candidates may strengthen the relationship between voters and representatives.

Furthermore, a run-off mechanism may be considered where majority legitimacy is required, ensuring that elected leaders possess broader public support.

Such reforms would not represent a rejection of South Africa’s democratic achievements. Instead, they would represent the natural evolution of constitutional democracy. The purpose of electoral reform is not to weaken existing institutions but to ensure that those institutions continue to serve the constitutional values upon which they were founded.

Ultimately, democracy is not measured only by the existence of elections nor by the number of political parties competing for power. Democracy is measured by whether citizens experience themselves as the true holders of political authority.

The legitimacy of government depends upon the continuing recognition that public power belongs to the people and is exercised only through their consent. The future of South African democracy therefore requires a renewed commitment to the constitutional principle that government exists by the people, for the people and through the people.

Electoral reform should place citizens at the centre of democratic governance by ensuring that their choices directly influence who represents them and how power is exercised.

The alternative proposed in this article is not merely a change to electoral mechanics; it is a constitutional vision of democracy that restores the political agency of citizens. A democracy strengthened by direct accountability, meaningful participation and responsible representation will be better positioned to confront future challenges and fulfil the promise of South Africa’s constitutional order.

The ultimate question facing South Africa is therefore not whether democracy has succeeded, but whether democracy continues to serve the people who gave it legitimacy. The answer lies in ensuring that the political will of citizens remains the foundation upon which government authority is built.

Keodirile Tladi is a South African legal professional, researcher and writer from Mabule Village in the North West Province, near Mahikeng, the provincial capital. He holds a Bachelor of Laws (LLB) and a Master of Laws (LLM) with Public Law and Legal Philosophy from North-West University. His academic and professional interests encompass constitutional law, human rights, public policy, democratic governance, electoral reform and legal philosophy. He is particularly interested in exploring the intersection of law, society, democracy and social justice, with a focus on South Africa’s constitutional development. Through his research and writing, he seeks to contribute to critical intellectual engagement, informed public discourse and the advancement of a just, accountable and democratic society.



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